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THE FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST
IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1981
GEORGE E. GARVEY*
INTRODUCTION
On December 15, 1981, the Chairman of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, Peter Rodino, introduced a bill entitled the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981 (Antitrust Im-
provements Act).' The Act proposes to amend the Sherman Act,
Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act to remove what
many perceive to be needless uncertainty concerning the extrater-
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law;
J.D. University of Wisconsin (1972); B.A., University of Illinois (1969). Former Counsel to
the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, House Committee on the
Judiciary (1980-1981).
1. H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Chairman Rodino initially introduced his bill
on March 4, 1981 as H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981). SenateJudiciary Chairman
Thurmond introduced a companion bill on March 25, 1981. S. 795, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. S2656 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1981). On December 10, 1981, the Subcommit-
tee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committe marked-up
H.R. 2326, adopting several changes proposed by witnesses at prior hearings. Chairman
Rodino subsequently introduced, on December 15, 1981, H.R. 5235 to incorporate the
amendments agreed to at the mark-up.
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ritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws.2 The Antitrust Im-
provements Act would limit the application of the Sherman Act3 and
Federal Trade Commission Act 4 to foreign conduct that has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on commerce within
the United States or which excludes U.S. entities from foreign com-
merce. 5 It also would amend section 7 of the Clayton Act6 to remove
from that section's reach joint ventures engaged solely in export
trade. 7 The Antitrust Improvements Act is one of several legislative
proposals intended to eliminate or minimize the perceived adverse
effects of the antitrust laws on export trade.8 Unlike alternative bills,
the Act deals with the perceived problems in a concise and direct
fashion.
This article will explore the effects of the antitrust laws on interna-
tional trade and the probable reasons for any adverse impact. It will
then consider the primary alternative legislative proposal intended
to remedy the perceived antitrust barrier to trade, the Export Trade
Association Act of 1981.9 Finally, the article examines the respon-
2. 127 CONG. REC. H779 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Rodino and Rep.
McClory regarding H.R. 2326).
3. 15 U.S.C. SS 1-7 (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. S 45(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
5. See infra note 192.
6. 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
7. See infra note 192.
8. Three types of legislative solutions have been introduced to solve the perceived prob-
lem that antitrust enforcement is a barrier to desirable export trade. The first attempts to
clarify the application of antitrust laws to foreign commerce. See H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); S. 795, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. S2556 (daily ed. Mar. 25,
1981). The second would provide a more elaborate exemption procedure under the existing
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 61-65 (1976). See H.R. 1648, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. S3667 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981). The third would require the Department of
Justice to identify types of activities that do not violate antitrust laws and provide parties
binding opinions regarding the legality of specific conduct. See H.R. 3066, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); S. 871, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REc. S3377 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1981).
9.S. 734, 97th Cong., lst Sess., tit. II, 127 CoNG. REC. S3667, S3669-71 (daily ed. Apr.
8, 1981). The Export Trade Association Act of 1981 is generally considered part of the Ex-
port Trading Company Act of 1981, title I of S. 734, and is frequently referred to by that
name. On April 8, 1981, the Senate approved S. 734 by a unamimous vote. 127 CoNG.
REC. S3667 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981). Because S. 734 has progressed further through the
legislative process than its House counterpart, H.R. 1648, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
references in this article to the Export Trade Association Act relate to the Senate version of
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siveness of the Antitrust Improvements Act to the problems and the
potential hazards of an altered antitrust policy.
EFFECTS OF U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
During the past decade the U.S. position in international trade
has deteriorated badly in several respects: the U.S. share of the in-
ternational market has declined dramatically;' ° U.S. producers
have become increasingly vulnerable to competition within the
United States from foreign industries;'1 OPEC has jarred the U.S.
economy with massive oil price increases; 12 and the United States
has suffered huge deficits in its balance of payments. 13 Each of these
factors has stimulated efforts by both the executive and legislative
branches of government to establish and pursue aggressively
policies that will promote U.S. exports.
14
Traders and observers have repeatedly identified the U.S. an-
titrust laws and their enforcement as barriers to desirable joint ex-
port activities.' 5 For example, after President Kennedy established
the White House Conference on Export Expansion in 1963 to con-
the bill unless otherwise indicated.
10. From 1970 to 1979, forexample, the U.S. share of total world exports decreased from
18 percent to 14 percent. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS TOGETHER
WITH THE STUDY ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS, Table 111-4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT].
11. See M. DAWSON, LESSONS FROM THE PAST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NATIONAL Ex-
PORT EXPANSION PROGRAMS 1963-1980, at 8-12 (undated study published by the Landegger
Program in Int'l Bus. Diplomacy at Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Serv.)
[hereinafter cited as M. DAWSON]; Antitrust and U.S. International Competitiveness, Int'l
Economic Affairs Dep't, Nat'l Ass'n Mfrs., (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Interna-
tional Competitiveness].
12. The price of a barrel of imported oil increased nearly nine-fold from 1973 to 1980:
$3.60 to $30.60. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE IN
1980: SUMMARY CHARTS 16 (Mar. 1981).
13. Id. at 15.
14. For a review of executive branch efforts to address the foreign trade problems faced by
U.S. industry, -see M. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 13-33. Congressional concern is il-
lustrated by the number of recently introduced bills designed to assist U.S. industry to com-
pete more effectively in foreign trade. See supra note 8.
15. M. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 3; Dempsey, The Whole World is the Market - Implications
for U.S. Antitrust Policy in U.S. International Competitiveness, supra note 11, at 3; Steven-
son, U.S. Antitrust Policy and International Economic Realities, in U.S. International Com-
petitiveness, supra note 11, at 1.
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sider ways to stimulate U.S. exports, 6 the Conference found only
two export disincentives imposed by the government, and one of
them was the uncertain reach of the U.S. antitrust laws. 17 Although
subsequent executive studies have identified a larger number of
government erected barriers to export trade, the more recent studies
continue to cite potential antitrust liability as a factor."'
The adverse effect of the antitrust laws on U.S. export trade may
be divided into two categories. The first is largely a matter of percep-
tion: U.S. business thinks that the antitrust laws are a significant
barrier to the types of collective activity that they believe are
necessary to combat significant risks and competitive practices in
the international market. The second, related problem arises from
the uncertain jurisdictional scope of the laws.
U.S. Industry Perception of the Antitrust Laws
as a Trade Barrier
Although the antitrust laws have been consistently identified as an
export disincentive, little concrete evidence exists to support the
claim that these laws have deterred otherwise legal trade activities. 19
Several recent studies demonstrate the absence of grounds for this
concern. In July 1980, the U.S. Trade Representative and the
Secretary of Commerce transmitted to President Carter an exten-
sive evaluation of government incentives and disincentives to U.S.
export trade. 20 The report identified taxation of U.S. citizens work-
ing overseas, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2' and export con-
trol legislation as the most significant barriers to export trade.
22
16. M. DAWSON, supra note 11, at 1.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Hearings on H.R. 2326, H.R. 1648, and H.R. 2459 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of
John H. Shenefield, Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy) [hereinafter cited as
Subcommittee Hearings]. See Shenefield, Antitrust and U.S. Exports-Myth Over Reality, in U.S.
International Competitiveness, supra note 11, at 7.
20. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH Ex-
PORT PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND POTENTIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES (1980) [hereinafter
cited as EXECUTIVE BRANCH REVIEW].
21. 15 U.S.C. SS 78a, 78m, 78dd-2, 78ff (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
22. EXECUTIVE BRANCH REVIEW, supra note 20, at 1-7.
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Referring to the antitrust laws, the report stated: "The extrater-
ritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws and their application to certain
types of international transactions also concern exporters, but no
specific instances were shown of these laws unduly restricting ex-
ports."2" Furthermore, John Ongman recently concluded on the
basis of economic theory that there is no evidence of significant an-
titrust barriers to export trade: "On the basis of available evidence,
the Sherman Act does not substantially impede export trade in
goods and services. The theoretical arguments of this article predict
that such evidence will not be found.
24
Because business has generally been unwilling or unable to iden-
tify the specific international activities that they have avoided
because of antitrust concerns, 25 it is difficult either to confirm or
disprove the validity of their fears. Any concern, however, has
become substantially less tenable over time. In 1977 the Department
ofJustice announced in the Antitrust Guide for International Operations
26
that it does not believe that the antitrust laws extend to foreign ac-
tivities unless they have a "substantial and foreseeable effect on the
United States commerce .... ,,27 Furthermore, the Antitrust Guide
analyzes in depth the antitrust implications of fourteen cases that il-
lustrate the problems most likely to face U.S. businesses engaged in
foreign trade.2 8 Additionally, the Justice Department has gone even
further to eliminate the fears of U.S. business engaged or capable of
engaging in export trade. Under the Department's business review
procedure, it will provide a statement of its enforcement intentions
regarding specific conduct submitted for review.2 9 In 1978, the An-
titrust Division sent 35,000 letters to businesses stating that it would
review any export-related matter within thirty days.30
23. Id. at 1-9. However, the perceived uncertainties about the application of antitrust
law to trading companies remains a factor that may deter U.S. indurtry. Id.
24. Ongman, Is Somebody Crying Wolf: An Assessment of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export
Trade, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus., 163, 218, (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ongman].
25. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19, at 3 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
26. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS, (rev. ed. Mar. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE].
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 10-63.
29. 28 C.F.R. S 50.6 (1981).
30. Shenefield, Antitrust and U.S. Exports-Myth Over Reality, in U.S. International Com-
petitiveness, supra note 11, at 13; see also Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement
1982]
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This two-pronged response by the Department of Justice to the
U.S. industry perception of the existence of an antitrust barrier to
foreign trade is quite extraordinary. The Antitrust Guide provides
private antitrust counselors with the views of the agency bearing
reponsibility for antitrust enforcement by demonstrating the ap-
plication of the laws to concrete problems. If greater assurance is
desired, an exporter may obtain on an expedited basis the actual en-
forcement intentions of the Department before committing itself to a
course of action. Few other areas of law allow businesses to protect
themselves so thoroughly prior to engaging in desired activities. 31
Although U.S. business may continue to perceive the antitrust
laws as a barrier to desirable joint activities in foreign commerce,
they are not, in fact, an impediment to the type of concerted conduct
advocated by proponents of greater export trade: efficiency-creating
combinations between firms that are not sufficiently large to enter
foreign markets alone.
32
Uncertainties Concerning the Extraterritorial Scope
of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
The uncertain jurisdictional scope of the antitrust laws may deter
aggressive exports both by creating doubt over the actual realm of
potential liability and by heightening the perception of an antitrust
risk.33 There are basically three scholarly and judicial approaches to
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws: (1) an "effects" test;
(2) a "comity" approach; and (3) an "in commerce" analysis. The
of John H. Shenefield).
31. Shenefield, Antitrust and U.S. Exports -Myth Over Reality, in U.S. International Com-
petitiveness, supra note 11, at 13.
32. Id. at 10-14.
33. For analyses of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, see generallyJ.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER]; COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN AN-
TITRUST (J. Rahl ed. 1970); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as W. FUGATE]; B. HAWK, UNITED STATES COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979) [hereinafter cited as B.
HAWK]; PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND
OTHER LAWS U. Griffin ed. 1970); Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International
Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16 (1974); Ongman, Be No Longer a Chaos: Constructing a Nor-
mative Theory of the Sherman Act's ExtraterritorialJurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. L. REV. 773 (1977);
Paugh, Antitrust Principles and U.S. Trade Laws: A Review of Current Areas of Conflict, 12 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 545 (1980).
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mere existence of three analytical approaches to defining the reach
of the antitrust laws, as well as the potential for inconsistent applica-
tions by courts adopting any one of the theories, is a cause for uncer-
tainty and arguably creates a chilling effect on U.S. foreign com-
merce.
The Sherman Act proscribes restraints of trade and monopoliza-
tion of "commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations. , 
4
The Sherman Act, however, does not define foreign commerce. The
formulation of this definition has been left to the courts, and they
have provided several interpretations.
The earliest signficant case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressing the issue of the reach of the antitrust laws, American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., held that Congress, consistent with prevailing
notions of international law, did not intend antitrust law to reach
conduct occuring in other nations.3 5 Mr. Justice Holmes, writing
for the majority, emphasized the place of the alleged violation as a
factor:
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done.. . . For another
jurisidiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its notions rather than those of the
place where he did-the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other
state concerned justly might resent.
36
In subsequent decisions, the Court shifted its focus from the loca-
tion of the conduct and thereby substantially limited the import of
American Banana. In Thomsen v. Cayser37 and United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 38 for example, the Court predicated jurisdiction on the nexus
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
35. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
36. Id. at 356.
37. 243 U.S. 66 (1917). In Thomsen, defendants were carriers in South African trade.
Plaintiffs, shippers, alleged that defendants, united as "The South African Lines," fixed
rates and shut off outside competition by requiring shippers to pay a percentage in addition
to a reasonable freight rate, which would be refunded to the shippers only if they refrained
from shipping by other lines. Id. at 74. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
judgment in favor of plaintiffs under the Sherman Act. Id. at 89.
38. 274 U.S. 268 (1927). In Sisal Sales, appellees-three U.S. banks, two Delaware cor-
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between the conspiracy and the United States, and the effects of the
challenged conduct on U.S. commerce. The fact that the con-
spiracies were effectuated primarily through extraterritorial conduct
was not controlling in either case.
39
The trend toward an "effects" standard culminated in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America.40 The international aspect of the Alcoa
case involved an agreement made abroad between foreign com-
petitors. 41 The situs of both the agreement and the conduct was,
therefore, outside the United States. Judge Learned Hand, writing
for the court, observed that the analysis should focus on the place
where the "effects" were experienced rather than on the situs of the
conduct or agreement. 42 Recognizing the potential conflict between
U.S. and foreign trade policies, however, Judge Hand concluded
that foreign conduct which is intended to affect U.S. commerce, and
does so, will create Sherman Act liability.43 Finally, the opinion
established a presumption that the prohibited effects had occurred
porations, a Mexican corporation, and a U.S. broker-secured a monopoly of interstate
and foreign commerce in sisal, in part by persuading the governments of Mexico and
Yucatan to enact discriminatory legislation. Id. at 272-73. The Court distinguished
American Banana:
Here we have a contract, combination and conspiracy entered into by parties
within the United States and made effective by acts done therein .... The United
States complain of a violation of their laws within their own territory by parties
subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of something done by another government
at the instigation of private parties. True, the conspirators were aided by
discriminating legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere,
they brought about forbidden results within the United States. They are within
the jurisdiction of our courts and may be punished for offenses against our laws.
Id. at 276.
39. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. at 88; United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at
276.
40. 148 F.2d 416, 439-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
41. Id. at 442. In Alcoa, the court examined a Swiss corporation or "cartel," formed by a
Canadian corporation, a French corporation, two German corporations, a Swiss corpora-
tion, and a British corporation, that exercised control over the production of aluminum. Id.
42. Id. at 443. The court noted that "it is settled law... that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends." Id.
43. Id. at 443-44. Judge Hand also stated that, in light of international complications
likely to arise, "it is safe to assume" that Congress did not-intend the Sherman Act to reach




once the intent was found.44-The court thus shifted the burden to the
defendant to prove that the intended results had not been achieved.
Alcoa's intent requirement has proven to be of little practical con-
sequence. Courts often have looked solely to the effect that the
challenged conduct has had on the foreign or domestic commerce of
the United States, without considering the intent of the parties. 45 A
leading treatise on international antitrust concludes that:
[1]n applying Alcoa the courts have focused more on objective
evidence of the impact on United States commerce and on
the reasonable foreseeability of that impact, rather than on
the actor's state of mind. For purposes of jurisdiction, intent
seems to be worth consideration as a major issue only where
the impact on the United States is indirect and not terribly
substantial in size.
46
The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice
has adopted an "effects" test. The Antitrust Guide states:
[T]he U.S. Antitrust laws should be applied to an overseas
transaction when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on
44. Id. at 444.
45. See, e.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 9 63,836 (2d Cir. 1981) (while asserting that "the inquiry should be directed primari-
ly toward whether the challenged restraint has, or is intended to have, any anticompetitive
effect upon United States commerce," the court went on to note that the "critical factor" was
the likelihood of "anticompetitive effect" upon U.S. commerce); Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affld 461 F.2d
1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (a "direct" effect on U.S. commerce suffi-
cient to support Sherman Act jurisdiction); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Am. President Lines,
285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 395 U.S. 922 (1969). But see Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[w]hen foreign nations are
involved ... it is unwise to ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and
limitations ofjudicial power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to
exercise or decline jurisdiction."); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F. 2d
597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[t]he effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider
other nations' interests").
Fugate suggests that Alcoa may be read to indicate that the intent element will be con-
sidered only when no U.S. subjects are involved, i.e., that "courts will scrutinize the ac-
tivities of foreigners abroad with more care before arriving at a conclusion as to the effects of
such acts on U.S. foreign trade." W. FUGATE, supra note 33, at 74; accord, REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 76 (1955).
46. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, S 6.07, at 154.
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the United States commerce...
[T]o apply the Sherman Act to a combination of
United States firms for foreign activities which have no direct
or intended effect on United States consumers or export oppor-
tunities would, we believe, extend the Act beyond the point
Congress must have intended.
47
The "effects" criterion has enjoyed widespread judicial ac-
ceptance, 48 but federal courts have never reached a consensus on the
formulation of the standard. 49 They have noted jurisdiction when
activities have had "direct, ' 50  "substantial, '51  and
"anticompetitive"5 2 effects on commerce. Application of these stan-
dards may result in the same disposition in any particular case, 53 but
there have been other formulations that would justify, or perhaps
47. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 26, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., supra note 45.
49. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F. 2d at 610-11 (citing cases and
summarizing the various formulations of the effects standard); Occidental Petroleum Corp
v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. at 102. See also American Bar Ass'n, Section of An-
titrust Law, Report to Accompany Resolutions Concerning Legislative Proposals to Pro-
mote Export Trading, 11-13 (Oct. 26, 1981) (citing cases and discussing consequences of
different formulations of standard) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
50. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587,
modifying 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("directly affected the flow of commerce out of
this country"); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. at 103
("the interference with plaintiffs business ... alleged in the complaint is certainly a 'direct'
effect on foreign commerce"); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp.
284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and affd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ("direct and influencing
effect on trade. .. between the United States and foreign countries").
51. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F. 2d at 1292 (observing that, in
general, "practices having a substantial effect on American foreign commerce are subject to
the Sherman Act").
52. E.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 63,836, at 78,472 ("the inquiry should be directed primarily toward whether the challeng-
ed restraint has, or is intended to have, any anticompetitive effect upon United States com-
merce. . .."); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir.
1979) ("Sherman Act jurisdiction now depends upon a showing of anticompetitive effects
within the United States.") See Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 1978-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,378, at 76,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
53. The ABA Report, supra note 49, at 14, states that beyond the simple recitation of the
chosen "effects" test there is similarity in the approaches of many of the recent opinions. The
report suggests that the true focus of the inquiry is the challenged conduct's foreclosure of
other United States companies' export opportunities. Id. at 16.
[Vol. 14:1
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
require, different conclusions. These cases state or imply that any ef-
fect 54 or a not insubstantia5s effect on U.S. commerce is sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of an antitrust court.
The unpredictable aspects of the effects test are compounded by
the nebulous concept of "foreign commerce." Clearly, the import
and export trade of the United States is U.S. foreign commerce. 56 In
Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far West Lines, Inc., however, the Court
concluded that the shipment of cement and fertilizer between
Taiwan and South Vietnam was foreign commerce of the United
States, primarily because the shipments were financed through the
Agency for International Development. 57 The source of the financ-
ing, and the fact that both the conspirators and injured carriers were
U.S. flagship operators, established a dominant U.S.
"characteristic" sufficient to render the defendants liable for ex-
cluding a U.S. competitor from the trade between two foreign na-
tions .58
54. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428(9th Cir. 1977),
which clarified Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 ("although
foreign activities must of course have some effect on United States foreign commerce before
they can be reached, we disagree ... that the effect must be 'substantial' ") (emphasis in
original); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, S.P.A. v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 1977-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256, at 70,783-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (averments sufficient to invoke
Sherman Act because, inter alia, "required element" of "impact upon United States com-
merce" present).
55. E.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("it is probably not necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both
substantial and direct as long as it is not de minimis"). See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. But-
tes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. at 102-03 (distinguishing "direct and substantial 'effect'"
which is necessary to find a violation of the Sherman Act from the effect which is "no' both in-
substantial and indirect" which will suffice to support jurisdiction under the Act). See also Sub-
committee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of David H. Goldsweig) (citing Dominicus
Americana as an example of the uncertainty which surrounds the formulation of the "effects"
standard in private litigation).
56. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824), in which the Court
stated: "It has, we believe, been universally admitted that [the words of the Commerce
Clause,] comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States
and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other,
to which this power does not extend."
57. 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
58. Id. at 816.
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It is reasonable and internationally acceptable to predicate
jurisdiction over foreign or domestic persons engaged in foreign ac-
tivities on the impact of their conduct on U.S. commerce. 59 It is dif-
ficult to discern with any certainty, however, which formulation of
the standard a particular court will apply. At one extreme, liability
may be based on a finding that the activity in question had any effect
on foreign commerce with U.S. characteristics, while another judge
may require proof that the conduct had a direct, substantial, and
foreseeable effect on commerce within the United States. Clarifica-
tion of this standard is an appropriate matter for legislative action .60
A second approach to defining the extraterritorial reach of the
U.S. antitrust laws involves the application of principles of interna-
tional comity. In 1976, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America that the
jurisdictional determination in an antitrust action involving foreign
commerce should not rest solely on the domestic effects of the activi-
ty.61 The Court discussed the diverse formulations that had been ap-
plied and noted that strict adherence to the "direct and substantial"
formulation could have undesirable results:
59. The "effects" doctrine is not universally embraced but is widely accepted. See B.
HAWK, supra note 33, at 33 (noting a "growing acceptance" of an effects doctrine by Euro-
pean antitrust authorities). West Germany and Austria have explicit provisions in their
laws providing for application of the "effects" test to extraterritorial activities having pro-
hibited domestic effects. Rahl, International Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and
Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 340-41 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rahl]. In addi-
tion, the EEC has endorsed the effects doctrine for application of the Treaty of Rome an-
titrust provisions. Id. The United Kingdom, while opposing the "effects" standard on the
grounds of national sovereignty, obtains the benefits of the standard by virtue of its
membership in the EEC. Id.
60. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 at 9-11, (statement of James R. Atwood,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State). At-
wood states that a strong case can be made that it is time for legislative intervention, since
the need for clarification in the law is strong and overdue, and Congress, through the
medium of legislative history, can provide the full background and explanation for what
may appear to be a shift in U.S. law. Id. at 10-11; cf. ABA Report, supra note 49, at 23
(recommending that Congress postpone consideration of antitrust legislation until it
receives a detailed expert study of the interplay of the U.S. antitrust laws with foreign
trade).
61. 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976). In Timberlane, plaintiffs alleged that officials of the
Bank of America and others located in both the United States and Honduras conspired to
prevent Timberlane, through its Honduras subsidiaries, from milling lumber in Honduras
and exporting it to the United States. Id. at 601. Holding that Sherman Act jurisdiction is
not limited to cases of direct and substantial effect on U.S. foreign commerce, the court
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In some cases, the application of the direct and substantial
test in the international context might open the door too
widely by sanctioning jurisdiction over an action when [in-
ternational comity and fairness] would indicate dismissal. At
other times, it may fail in the other direction, dismissing a
case for which comity and fairness do not require
forebearance, thus closing the jurisdictional door too
tightly-for the Sherman Act does reach some restraints
which do not have both a direct and substantial effect on the
foreign commerce of the United States.
62
Timberlane established a three-part test: (1) the activity must have
some actual or intended effect on U.S. foreign commerce; (2) the ef-
fect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable injury to the
plaintiff; and (3) the interest of the United States must be sufficiently
strong vis-a-vis any other related nations to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction .63
The Timberlane approach has gained some acceptance. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit developed it further in Mann-
ington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. by identifying ten factors to con-
sider in determining whether the principles of comity permit the
assertion ofjurisdiction.64 Officials of the Department ofJustice, the
Department of State, and the Federal Trade Commission have also
devised a three-part "balancing test" to apply in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction
under the Act. Id. at 615.
62. Id. at 613.
63. Id.
64. 595 F.2d at 1297-98. The factors are:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; 2. Nationality of the partics;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad; 4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; 5.
Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; 6.
Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exefcises jurisdiction and grants
relief; 7. If relief is granted whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting re-
quirements by both countries; 8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances; 10. Whether a treaty with the affected
nations has addressed the issue.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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expressed support for the Timberlane test. 65 Atwood and Brewster
conclude that "it is likely that the Timberlane approach, deemphasiz-
ing the effects test in favor of a more complex and multivariable
comity analysis, will be influential if not controlling in foreign com-
merce litigation for some time to come.
"66
To the extent that the Timberlane/Mannington Mills model directs
courts to consider the possible conflicting interests of foreign na-
tions, and identifies various relevant factors, it is a desirable
development. It does present problems, however. First, it inten-
tionally minimizes the "effects" requirement.67 Given the high
regard courts have shown for the policy underlying the Sherman
Act, 68 a jurisdictional standard that ultimately turns on a balancing
of conflicting policies may extend the reach of the law to foreign ac-
tivities having an insignificant nexus to U.S. commerce. 69 In addi-
tion, Timberlane magnifies existing uncertainty regarding the ap-
plication of antitrust laws as it is frequently difficult to predict the ac-
tual effects of prospective foreign conduct on commerce in the
United States. Sound counseling under Timberlane would require
both a reasonable estimation of the likely U.S. effects of the conduct
and an analysis of foreign and domestic laws and policy. In Mann-
ington Mills for example, the court of appeals remanded the case to
the district court to determine the policies of twenty-six different na-
tions regarding the validity and abuse of patent rights.70
Finally, a requirement that courts engage in an extensive comity
65. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, § 6.11, at 162.
66. Id. at 163.
67. 595 F.2d at 613.
68. In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court summariz-
ed the policy underlying the Sherman Act in the following terms:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competitition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an en-
vironment conducive to the preservation of our democratic and social institutions.
Id. at 4. See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
69. SeeOccidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & OR Co., 331 F. Supp. at 102-03 (im-
plying that courts confuse jurisdictional prerequisite with effect necessary to find a violation
of the Sherman Act). But see ABA Report, supra note 49, at 14 (suggesting that, despite
various formulations of the jurisdictional standard, results of cases show that true focus of
courts has been foreclosure of export opportunities to United States companies).
70. 595 F.2d at 1298.
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analysis in every antitrust case involving extraterritorial conduct
before admitting jurisdiction raises significant administrative pro-
blems. 71 Neither the source of the court's knowledge of the relevant
laws nor the proper allocation of the burden of proving that comity
principles justify the assertion of jurisdiction is readily apparent. It
would be intolerable to require plaintiffs in every case to establish, as
a threshold requirement, all relevant foreign and domestic internal
and international law and policy and the appropriateness of the ac-
tion under these possibly conflicting norms. It is also unrealistic to
compel courts to take judicial notice of the relevant laws of foreign
nations.
Courts have not been insensitive to the interests of foreign govern-
ments. The Timberlane court admitted that the "direct and substan-
tial effects" formulation implicitly took foreign interests into ac-
count. 72 Likewise, the act of state73 and foreign government com-
pulsion7 4 doctrines have mandated dismissal to avoid international
71. 1J. ATwooD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, § 6.21 at 180. "Thus, while Timberlane
and Mannington Mills provide an analytically sound framework for determining the proper
scope of Sherman Act extraterritorial jurisdiction, whether that framework is workable in
the day-to-day world of litigation is still to be proven." Id.
72. 548 F.2d at 612.
73. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976) ("the
major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing court adjudica-
tions involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the
Executive Branch in the conduct of our foreign relations"); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("the less important the implications of an issue are for our
foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity [of decision] in the political
branches"); see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (3d
Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 72-3 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
The classic statement of the act of state doctrine is contained in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit injudgement on the acts
of government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
74. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606-07; United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified,
1965 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); W. FUGATE, supra note 33, at 75-82;
ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 26, at 8.
A good statement of the foreign compulsion doctrine is contained in Mannington Mills:
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embarrassment. If a conflict of laws analysis is needed in addition to
the act of state and compulsion doctrines, however, it makes more
sense to retain. the effects test as the threshold jurisdictional stan-
dard. It is reasonable to assume that the United States has no in-
terest in regulating foreign conduct that does not have some mean-
ingful impact on U.S. interests. After the original determination of
jurisdiction, a balancing of competing national policies could justify
dismissal of the case upon a finding by the court of appropriate
facts.7 5 While a defendant must expect to bear the burden of
establishing the propriety of dismissing the case, 76 a court may
choose as a matter of sound policy to allow the federal government to
intervene in a private suit and advise it of the foreign policy implica-
tions of a dispute."
Similar in effect but somewhat distinct [to the act of state doctrine] is the defense of
foreign compulsion which shields from antitrust liability the acts of parties carried
out in obedience to the mandate of a foreign government. The sovereign compul-
sion defense is not principally concerned with the validity or legality of the foreign
government's order, but rather with whether it compelled the American business
to violate American antitrust law.
595 F.2d at 1293.
75. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1299-1303 (Adams, J., concurring. Contra 1J. AT-
wooD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, S 6.13, at 166.
76. Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf& Western, 473 F. Supp. 680, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) ("In]aturally, the defendants must bear the burden of demonstrating that foreign
policy considerations outweigh the need to enforce the antitrust laws where the foreign com-
merce of the United States is affected.").
77. John H. Shenefield has stated that, in the context of cases where American interests
are weak, "[wihile it is clear that the defendant ought to have the burden on filing a motion
for dismissal of setting out why subject matter jurisdiction should not be exercised, it is less
clear who should have the burden of ultimately persuading the court." Address by John H.
Shenefield, ABA Int'l Law Section (Dec. 10, 1980), reprinted in 5TRADE REC. REP. (CCH)
50,424, at 55,964. Shenefield expressed the view that which side should have that burden
depends on what kind of test is involved -"[w]hether the court is making a jurisdictional
finding based on conflicts factors or an abstention decision based on quasi-diplomatic and
relief issues," - and concluded that "[i]f the test is designed to determine whether domestic
antitrust law is applicable, I think that the plaintiff should convince the court that there are
sufficient 'contacts' to justify this country's acting as a forum." Id.
Shenefield summarized the manner in'which the government has intervened in private
suits:
As you probably know, the Department of State had a practice -until 1978- of
conveying diplomatic notes from foreign nations to courts hearing cases with in-
ternational implications. At times the Department of State also sent its own
assessment of the case's importance to U.S. foreign relations. Since 1978, the
U.S. government has encouraged foreign governments to contact the courts
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The third analytical approach to the scope of the antitrust laws ap-
plies the laws whenever the action has taken place "in foreign com-
merce." James Rahl, former dean of the Northwestern University
Law School, has been the most articulate spokesman for the view
that antitrust jurisdiction is not limited to activities that affect U.S.
foreign or interstate commerce. 78 He believes that "the [Sherman]
Act reaches a restraint or monopolization either (1) if it occurs in the
course of foreign commerce, or (2) if it substantially affects either foreign
or interstate commerce."7 9 Under this formulation any restraint of
exports from or imports to the United States would be subject to
Sherman Act scrutiny regardless of where the effects might be ex-
perienced. It is enough that the restraint occurs in U.S. foreign com-
merce .80
Officials of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
have focused on the parties injured by extraterritorial activities and
have therefore rejected Dean Rahl's formulation.81 Rahl, on the
directly, rather than using us as an intermediary.
While I do not foresee a return to our practice before 1978, it may nevertheless
be appropriate - in highly unusual cases - for the United States government to
participate in some way. For example, it may be useful for the Department of
Justice to file an amicus brief for the limited purpose of providing the government's
assessment of the quasi-diplomatic factors involved in the case. Our participation
may assist the court by providing guidance as to the weight to be given various
quasi-diplomatic considerations, such as the likely impact on U.S. foreign rela-
tions. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Timberlane, the executive branch is in the
best position to judge quasi-diplomatic questions surrounding the conduct of
foreign affairs by the U.S. or foreign nations.
Id. at 55,966 (footnote omitted).
78. Rahl's views are expounded in the following publications: COMMON MARKET AND
AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (J. Rahl ed. 1970); Rahl, supra note 59, at
343-46; Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as American Antitrust]; Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the
American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Commerce
Jurisdiction].
79. Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction, supra note 78, at 523 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
80. Id.
81. American Antitrust, supra note 78, at 7; Douglas Rosenthal, former Chief of the Foreign
Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division, has stated his belief that courts do not, as a
matter of law, have jurisdiction over restraints of export trade where the injuries are felt
solely in foreign markets. HAWK, supra note 33, at 49. Professor Hawk disagrees with
Rosenthal's conclusion. Id. at 50.
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other hand, believes that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent
any restraint of the commerce of the United States. 82 Despite the
widespread acceptance of the effects test, the "in commerce" for-
mulation has a sound historic and scholarly basis. It is a respectable
interpretation of the Sherman Act and has implicit support in those
decisions applying a minimal standard.
83
In summary, the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws to
foreign commercial activities, or to domestic activities that primari-
ly affect commerce abroad, has never been clearly defined. The
earliest cases focused on the site of the conduct or on the place where
the agreement was entered into. Following Alcoa, a broad consensus
developed that the Sherman Act encompassed all activities having
an effect on domestic commerce or competitors without regard to
the locus of the agreement or conduct. The formulation of this ef-
fects standard, however, has never been uniform and the intent re-
quirement of Alcoa appears to have been lost in most subsequent for-
mulations. The Timberlane decision added greater flexibility to the
process but at the expense of certainty. A Timberlane/Mannington
Mills analysis may make the assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts
lcss traumatic to foreign sovereigns, but it renders the likelihood of
potential antitrust liability less predictable for U.S. business. In ad-
dition, it is not clear if Timberlane effectively supplants or sup-
plements the effects jurisdictional requirement. Finally, Dean Rahl's
arguments for an "in commerce" standard are persuasive. Antitrust
counselors certainly cannot discount the possibility that courts may
assert jurisdiction based solely on allegations that the purported il-
legal conduct occurred in U.S. foreign commerce.
The uncertainty that these several jurisdictional formulations
engender adds credibility to the argument that antitrust laws impair
trade. Atwood and Brewster conclude that:
The vagueness of these rules, relating as they do to the basic
scope of United States Antitrust, is an unfortunate commen-
tary on the state of American law... .American business will
on occasion be left with an unhappy choice between a
cautious approach that may mean a loss of commercial op-
portunities and a more persuasive interpretation that may
82. Rahl, supra note 59, at 343-44.
83. See supra notes 54-55.
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provoke costly litigation.8 4
THE EXPORT TRADE ASSOCIATION ACT OF 1981
The Antitrust Improvements Act is in part a response to other
legislative efforts that would more radically alter the application of
the antitrust laws to U.S. exporters.8 5 This section considers the
desirability of one of the more important of these alternatives cur-
rently being considered and receiving some support, the Export
Trade Association Act of 1981 (Trade Association Act).
86
The Trade Association Act would amend the Webb-Pomerene
Act8 7 and establish a regulatory procedure to obtain certification
that an export trading company or association may engage in
specified activities with limited antitrust immunity.8 The pro-
ponents of the bill believe that it would make three beneficial
changes to the Webb-Pomerene Act: first, protection would be ex-
tended to associations providing services, as well as to those selling
goods;8 9 second, administration of the Act would be shifted from the
84. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, § 7.10 at 196.
85. Remarks of the Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr., International Trade Seminar "How
to Export," 5-7 (Toms River, N.J., Oct. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Rodino Remarks]
(copy on file at the offices of Law & Policy in International Business).
86. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3669-71 (daily ed.
Apr. 8, 1981). See supra note 9.
87. 15 U.S.C. SS 61-66 (1976).
88. Details of the certification procedures are found at S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec.
206(a), 127CoNG. REc. S3667, S3670-71 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new section 4
to Webb-Pomerene Act §5 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. §5 64,65 (1976)). The limited antitrust exemp-
tion is found at id. sec. 204, 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3669-70 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (pro-
posing new section 2 to Webb-Pomerene Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. S 62 (1976)).
89. Id. sec. 203, 127 CONG. REc. S3667, S3669 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new
section I to Webb-Pomerene Act. S 1, 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1976)). ,
The Webb-Pomerene Act's failure to protect service organizations has been a matter of
some concern.
Another frequently cited criticism of the export trade association immunity [in
the Webb-Pomerene Act] is its limitation to goods, wares, and merchandise. The
Act provides no immunity for joint exporting of services. As a result, construction
and engineering firms indicate they can find no benefit from the Act, while many
other exporters may be apprehensive that the Commission or a court will find that
the ancillary services they provide connected with export sales are outside the
course of export trade protected by the Act.
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the Department of Com-
merce;90 and, third, the Trade Association Act's certification pro-
cedure would result in greater certainty regarding the applicability
of the antitrust laws to association activities.9'
Despite the laudable goals of the Trade Association Act, its ability
to stimulate trade has been seriously questioned. A Wall Street Journal
editorial, for example, referred to a predecessor bill, S. 2718, as
"mere gimmickry.'9 2 Indeed, this is a very dangerous time in U.S.
economic history to send a signal to business and labor alike that the
allowance of less competition by means of antitrust immunity is the
solution to the international trading problems of the United States.
Anything that distracts U.S. industry from a total commitment to
greater productivity and efficiency will delay the day that the United
States regains its prominent role in the international market.
93
There are also very specific objections to the Trade Association
Act, including: first, the Trade Association Act would establish an
Export Trading Companies and Trade Associations: Hearings on S. 864, S. 1499, S. 1663 and S.
1744 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-88 (1979) (statement of Daniel C. Schwartz, Deputy Direc-
tor, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate
Hearings].
The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures was not fully
satisfied that the Webb-Pomerene Act should be retained, but if it were, the Commission
believed its protection should be extended to service organizations. REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEw OF AN-
TITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 302-04 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION]
reprinted in part in 1979 Senate Hearings, supra, at 166-68. See Export Trading Company Act of 1981:
Hearings on S. 144 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance andMonetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 217-22 (1981) (testimony of Peter Gutt-
man, President, HPG Assocs.) [hereinafter cited as S. 144 Hearings].
90. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 206(a), 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3670-71 (daily
ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new section 4(a)-(d) to Webb-Pomerene Act S§ 4, 5 at 15
U.S.C. §§ 64, 65 (1976)). As it transfers primary administrative responsibility from the
Federal Trade Commission to the Department of Commerce, the Trade Association Act
creates an affirmative, mandatory oversight role for both the FTC and the Department of
Justice that is far more extensive than under the present Act. See id.
91. S. 144 Hearings, supra note 89, at 34 (testimony of Sen. Danforth); 127 CONG REC.
H779-80 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1981) (remarks of Rep. McClory).
92. Export Gimmickry, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1980, at 26, col. 1.
93. See Rodino Remarks, supra note 85, at 1, 4; Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (state-
ment of James A. Rahl, Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ.). The textile industry pro-
vides an excellent example of the need for, and benefits of, increased productivity. Not long
ago, the industry was unable to compete effectively against foreign competition within the
United States. A long-term commitment to modernization, however, has made the United
States textile industry the envy of much of Europe. It is not only strong domestically
[Vol. 14:1
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
extraordinarily complex multi-agency administrative process; se-
cond, it would employ a vehicle-the Webb-Pomerene Act-that
has proven itself largely unresponsive to the legitimate needs of U.S.
exporters; third, the bill contains an undesirable "negative preg-
nant," i.e., the implication that export trading companies and
associations need antitrust immunity; and, fourth, the "certainty"
that the bill attempts to create is illusory.
Bureaucratic Procedures
The primary purpose of the Trade Association Act is to promote
exporting by small- and medium-sized U.S. firms. 94 The method
sought to be employed, however, ignores two overriding factors.
First, the antitrust laws are not now a serious impediment to the type
of conduct the legislation seeks to foster among small firms. 95 For ex-
ample, two empirical studies commissioned by the Department of
Commerce and introduced at the Senate hearings on the bill con-
cluded that the antitrust laws do not prevent the establishment of
trading companies or associations by small companies. 96 One of
these studies concludes:
We believe that there are no fundamental legal issues which
constrain the Trading Company Concept. The
Webb-Pomerene Act certainly permits groups of firms to
join together under the umbrella of a trading company if that
were appropriate. The cases in which legal problems arose
with Webb Associations were ones in which the members
controlled a significant share of the domestic market in the
goods in which they dealt. We do not believe that small/med-
only strong domestically, but competes effectively abroad. Pine, Made in America: Many U.S.
Exporters Compete Successfully, Especially in Europe, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
94. S. 734, 97thCong., 1stSess., sec. 202(a)(7), 127CoNG. REc. S3667, S3669 (daily ed.
Apr. 8, 1981).
95. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
96. Economic Consulting Servs., Inc., A Study of the Feasibility of Export Trading
Companies to Promote Increased Exports by the U.S. Textile and Apparel Industries: Ex-
ecutive Summary 10 (Feb. 6, 1981), reprinted in S. 144 Hearings, supra note 89, at 57; Hay
Assocs., A Study to Determine the Feasibility of the Export Trading Company Concept As
a Viable Vehicle for Expansion of United States Exports 126-27 (Mar. 1977), reprinted in
1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 566-67.
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ium sized companies would have such difficulties. 97
The second significant factor disregarded by proponents of the
Trade Association Act is the effect of the additional bureaucratic
procedures on small business. The cost of complying with complex
federal regulation is a major disincentive to any activity by small
businesses. 98 The procedures contained in the proposed Trade
Association Act are regulation run rampant.
The chairman of a small firm that has successfully entered the ex-
port market reacted to the procedures contained in the Trade
Association Act as follows:
My real concern is that the required certification pro-
cedure set forth in S. 734, both as to information required in
the application and as to the administrative findings required
on need and on what the trading companies do not do, in-
volving three separate government departments, is so com-
plicated that it will serve more as a barrier than an incentive
so far as small business participation is concerned ....
We need incentives, not disincentives for small business to
enter into world trade. A complicated certification process
will be a disincentive, joining a number of others already in
place .99
Although one might respond that no disincentive or barrier will be
created because U.S. businesses will not be required to obtain cer-
tification under the Trade Association Act before engaging in export
activities, nevertheless the negative implications created by the ex-
istence of a complex administrative certification procedure'00 will
97. Hay Assocs., A Study to Determine the Feasibility of the Export Trading Company
Concept As a Viable Vehicle for Expansion of United States Exports 126 (Mar. 1977),
reprinted in 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 566.
98. Chilton & Weidenbaum, Small Business Performance in the Regulated Economy:
Working Paper No. 52 (Center for the Study of Small Business, Washington Univ., St.
Louis, Feb. 1980) (quoted in WHITE HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, AMERICA'S SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, AGENDA FOR ACTION) (Apr. 1980); see
Berney, The Rocky Roadjor Small Business, COLLEGIATE FORUM 4 (Fall 1981); The Conference
Board, Regulation: Its Impact on Decision Making, 35 (Report No. 803, 1981).
99. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of GordonJohnson, Chairman of Log.
Etronics, Inc.).
100. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
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force businesses to seek the protections of the Act. In short, the
Trade Association Act creates a major disincentive to export ac-
tivities by small firms - a complex bureaucracy - to eliminate a non-
barrier-antitrust. A review of the bill's procedures demonstrates
the extent of this problem.
Exporters seeking the protection of the Trade Association Act
would be required to file a detailed application with the Secretary of
Commerce. 10 1 This application would have to identify, inter alia, the
members, officers, and shareholders of the company or association,
its export trade activities 0 2 and methods of operation, 10 3 and a
description of the factors and circumstances which show that "its ac-
tivities will serve a specified need in promoting the export trade of
the described goods, wares, merchandise, or services.104
Before issuing a certificate, the Secretary of Commerce would
have to find that the applicant's trade activities and methods of
operation will serve a "specified need"105 in promoting exports and
(1) serve to preserve or promote export trade;
(2) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition
or restraint of trade within the United States nor a substan-
tial restraint of the export trade of any competitor of such
association or export trading company;
(3) do not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress
prices within the United States of the goods, wares, mer-
101. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 206(a), 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3670-71 (daily
ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new section 4(a) to Webb-Pomerene Act §§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C.
§S 64, 65 (1976)); see generally Murphy, The Export Trade Association Act of 1981 -A Brief
Analysis, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 399, 405-417 (1981).
102. "The term 'export trade activities' means activities or agreements in the course of ex-
port trade." S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 203, 127CoNG. REC. S3667, S3669 (daily ed.
Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new section 1(3) to Webb-Pomerene Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 61
(1976)). "The term 'export trade' means trade or commerce in goods, wares, merchandise,
or services, exported from the United States or any territory thereof to any foreign nation."
Id. (proposing new section 1(1)).
103. "The term 'methods of operation' means the methods by which an association or ex-
port trading company conducts or proposes to conduct export trade." Id. (proposing new
section 1(4)).
104. Id. sec. 206(a), 127CONG. REC.$3667, S3670-71 (dailyed. Apr. 8, 1981)(proposing
new section 4(a)(6) to Webb-Pomerene Act §§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. SS 64, 65 (1976).
105. Id.
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chandise, or services of the class exported by such association
or export trading company;
(4) do not constitute unfair methods of competition against
competitors engaged in the export trade of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services of the class exported by such
association or export trading company;
(5) do not include any act which results, or may reasonably
be expected to result, in the sale for consumption or resale
within the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise,
or services exported by the association or export trading
company or its members; and
(6) do not constitute trade or commerce in the licensing of
patents, technology, trademarks, or know-how, except as in-
cidental to the sale of the goods, wares, merchandise, or ser-
vices exported by the association or export trading company
or its members .... 106
If the Secretary of Commerce were to hold that certification was ap-
propriate, a copy of the proposed certificate would be delivered to
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). 10 7 TheJustice Department and/or the FTC could advise the
Secretary of Commerce within fifteen days of receipt of the proposed
certificate if either wished to offer advice regarding the Secretary's
determination.' 018 The objecting agency would then formally advise
the Commerce Department and the applicant of its disagreement
with the Secretary within forty-five days. 10 9 If the Secretary of Com-
merce chose to issue a certificate over the objection of the Justice
Department or FTC, the certificate would remain ineffective for
thirty days.1 0 During this thirty-day period either antitrust enforce-
ment agency would be permitted to file a suit in federal district court
106. Id. sec. 204, 127 CoNG. REc. S3667, S3669-70 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing
new section 2(a)(1)-(6) to Webb-Pomerene Act S 2, 15 U.S.C. S 62 (1976)).
107. Id. sec. 206(a), 127 GONG. REc. S3667, S3670 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing
new section 4(b)(1) to Webb-Pornerene Act SS 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. S§ 64, 65 (1976)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. sec. 204, 127CoNG. REc. S3667, $3670 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new
section 2(c) to Webb-Pomerene Act S 2, 15 U.S.C. S 62 (1976)).
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to revoke the certificate.' 11 Finally, the Secretary would be granted
the discretion to impose such terms and conditions as he may deem
necessary to comply with the Trade Association Act,' 12 and the cer-
tified company or association would have a continuing obligation to
report any material changes in its activities or operations.
1" 3
There was nearly unanimous agreement among the witnesses
who appeared before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary that the complex procedure of the Trade Association
Act would deter rather than promote export trade. 1 4 John H.
Shenefield, a former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division, referred to the House counterpart to the Trade Associa-
tion Act in stating:
Its erection of a complex regulatory structure of certifica-
tion, with provision for interdepartmental consultation,
mandating multiple, uncertain and burdensome avenues of
challenge and appeal, would in itself be a disincentive to ex-
port. The prospect of one agency of the United States
government suing to overturn the ruling of another agency is
hardly likely to reassure a business community seeking
clarification and guidance." 15
In a similar vein, an expert on regulatory matters said:
I have found over the years that it is almost impossible to
explain to the average citizen the logic of their having re-
ceived conflicting advice from separate Federal agencies.
When citizens deal with their Federal government, they
think of it as one government and they do not understand
111. Id. sec. 206(a), 127 CONG. REc. S3667, S3671 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing
new section 4(e) to Webb-Pomerene Act S§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. SS 64, 65 (1976)).
112. Id. sec. 206(a), 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3670 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing
new section 4(b)(1) to Webb-Pomerene Act SS 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. §S 64, 65 (1976)).
113. Id. 127 CONG. REc. S3667, S3671 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new section
4(c) to Webb-Pomerene Act § 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. S§ 64, 65 (1976)).
114. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statements of Eleanor M. Fox, Gordon
Johnson, Thomas M. Rees, and A. Paul Victor). In addition, one commentator has noted
that the internal provisions of the Trade Association Act are inconsistent. Murphy, supra
note 101, at 412-13.
115. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
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why it does not respond as one. 116
The difficulty generated by a multi-agency review is exacerbated
when, as in the Trade Association Act, the agencies have diverse
goals. The Commerce Department is charged with promoting ex-
ports, 1 7 while the Department of Justice and FTC must enforce the
antitrust laws and promote competition to the greatest extent possi-
ble. 1 8 History has shown that trade promotion agencies are general-
ly insensitive to the fundamental goals of antitrust, 119 and also that
the tension between bodies charged with enforcement and those
charged with promotion can result in extraordinary regulatory com-
plexity and delay. 1
20
The procedural provisions of the Trade Association Act have also
been criticized because of their extensive disclosure requirements
and the standards for certification.' 2 1 Applicants would have to
disclose potentially confidential infdrmation, e.g., future markets
and marketing practices, that may have nothing to do with competi-
tion. 122 Similarly, several of the criteria for certification, e.g., a
116. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of Fred Emery, Director, Federal
Register (1970- 79).
117. See 15 U.S.C. §S 1512 (1976).
118. See 15 U.S.C. SS 15, 45 (1976).
119. See Folsom, Antitrust Enforcement Under the Secretaries ofAgriculture and Commerce, 80CoL-
um. L. REV. 1623 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Folsom].
120. Hearings on H.R. 6899 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 94
(1980) (statement of Robert J. Blackwell); Hearings on H. R. 4769 Before the Subcomm. on Mer-
chant Marine, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 79, 405 (statements of Richard J. Dashbach, and W.
James Amoss, Jr.).
121. ABA Report, supra note 49, at 24-27. The procedural problems of the Trade
Association Act are also evident in the provisions allowing the creation of, participation in,
and, within specified limits, control of export trading companies by U.S. banks. S. 734,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 105, 127 CONG. REc. S3667, S3667-69 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981).
When a bank's investment or control becomes substantial, the Act would require that the
bank's activities be approved by an "appropriate" federal banking authority. Id. sec.
105(b)(1)(A)-(B), 127 CONC. REC. S3667, S3668 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981). An appropriate
authority may be (1) the Comptroller of the Currency, (2) the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or (4) the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board. Id. sec. 105(a)(9)(A)-(D), 127 CONG. REc. S3667 (daily ed. Apr.
8, 1981).
122- The Trade Association Act, as proposed, requires disclosure of the goods or services
to be sold, the countries where they will be sold, and the activities and methods to be
employed in their sale. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 206, 127 CONG. REC. S3667,
S3670 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposing new section 4(a)(5), (7), (8) to Webb-Pomerene
Act SS 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. S5 64, 65 (1976)).
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"specified need" in the promotion of export trade, have no relevance
to the concerns of the Sherman Act.
1 23
The problems inherent in government regulation may prove ex-
ceedingly difficult in the area of export trade: International trading
is a dynamic venture. 124 Opportunities arise quickly and frequently
must be seized or lost. 125 The regulatory "lag" that annoys public
utilities 26 could prove fatal to U.S. trading companies that rely
largely on secrecy and speed.127 Moreover, the regulatory lag that
prevents utilities from quickly passing through their cost increases
provides a "dividend" to the utility's consumers. 28 Trade oppor-
tunities lost due to regulatory delay, however, would have no offset-
ting benefits for the public.
Government regulation presents two problems: first, regulation
such as that of the Trade Association Act 2 9 imposes restrictions and
costs on the regulated party, 30 and second, government regulation
tends to foster monopoly where competition is both possible and
123. Three of the six criteria for certification have little, if any, relationship to the goals of
the antitrust laws. The second (trade restraints), third (price fixing), and fourth (unfair
methods of competition) criteria of section 204 relate to traditional antitrust concerns, i.e.,
the maintenance of competition. The first, fifth, and sixth, however, foster goals relating to
promoting exports, preventing resale of exported goods in the U.S., and eliminating un-
necessary licensing of patents, trademarks, or know-how. See supra note 106 and accompa-
nying text.
124. See Inside Philipp Bros., A $9 Billion Supertrader, Bus. WEEK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 108.
125. Id.
126. The regulatory process prevents utilities from immediately passing through cost in-
creases to consumers. R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW S 12 (2d ed. 1977); Warren,
The Regulatory Lag Fallacy, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 14, 1980, at 15-16.
127. Inside Philipp Bros., A $9 Billion Supertrader, Bus. WEEK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 111.
128. When during periods of rising costs a utility is unable to raise prices to maintain a
'reasonable" return, its consumers, rather than its shareholders, receiving the benefit of ser-
vice at a price below competitive levels. Warren, supra note 126, at 17.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
130. R. Carr, The Taxes of Regulation, Remarks before the Allegheny Bar Association
(Pittsburgh, Pa., Oct. 1, 1981) (copy on file at the offices of Law & Policy in International
Business). Carr, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, argues that:
the routes of escape from regulatory supression are almost necessarily less efficient
than those of the unimpeded market, and hence impose costs-taxes-on the
society. Consumers in the affected markets bear much of those costs, most ob-
viously in the form of higher than competitive prices, sometimes in poorer quality
products or services, but also in the form of restricted output and reduced incen-
tives for innovation and increased productivity.
Id.
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desirable.' 3 ' When this occurs it is the public that suffers. 132 In the
context of the Trade Association Act, the public interest would be
injured if the antitrust enforcement agencies do not seriously review
all proposed certificates for potential anticompetitive effects. The
Commerce Department, the body responsible for that review, has
demonstrated some insensitivity to the goals of antitrust in the
past. 1
33
It is essential that the appropriate regulatory bodies remain con-
stantly alert to the danger that a certified company or association
may achieve immunized monopoly power. The legislation envisions
the creation of efficiency-promoting combinations. 134 If the induce-
ment to export, however, becomes the unrestrained ability to exact
monopoly profits, rather than the right to enter efficiency-
promoting associations, domestic consumers and competitors will
be threatened. Monopoly profits can, after all, only be achieved by
restricting production to a level lower than that which would exist in
a competitive market. When this occurs, the supra-competitive pro-
fits in the export market will draw the product out of the U.S.
market and raise domestic prices.1 35 Furthermore, the exporters will
naturally be inclined to attempt to control domestic supply and
prices to prevent arbitrage. 36 In short, there would be a strong in-
centive to suppress production artificially in both foreign and
domestic markets to force a price increase.
The grant of monopoly power to an export cartel would also
create an incentive to eliminate actual or potential competition from
domestic firms for the export market. a37 A cartel simply cannot
tolerate competition.13 8 A monopolistic association, therefore,
131. See, e.g, R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 347-49 (1978); see alsoR. POSNER, supra
note 126, S 12.8.
132. BORK, supra note 131, at 364.
133. See Folsom, supra note 119, at 1634, 1638.
134. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 202(a)(7), 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3669 (daily
ed. Apr. 8, 1981).
135. Those who oppose export trade combinations argue that they not only encourage an-
ticompetitive conduct abroad, but also invite the opportunity for similar restraints with
respect to prices and production in the domestic market. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra
note 89, at 299.
136. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 205-06.
137. Id.
138. Firms operating outside the cartel can often benefit from the high prices set by the
cartel by charging a lower price. By taking business away from the cartel, outside competi-
tion ultimately causes its dissolution. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 300.
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would have a strong motive to react aggressively to the entry of any
non-member competitor and might have the power to engage in
predatory competition, at least with small competitors.
The regulatory mechanism and certification process of the Trade
Association Act will have adverse effects if enacted. If the Act's re-
quirements are strictly adhered to, the financial costs, as well as the
aggravation, will provide a strong disincentive to potential small-
and medium-sized exporters. If enforcement is relaxed to minimize
this problem, the public interest may suffer through increased
monopolization of the U.S. export trade.
Webb-Pomerene Act
The Trade Association Act would expand the Webb-Pomerene
Act 139 to provide a more elaborate certification mechanism in an ef-
fort to make antitrust immunity more certain. 140 The reliance on an
expanded Webb-Pomerene Act is based on two faulty premises:
first, the Webb-Pomerene Act does not adequately protect small-
and medium-sized firms,' 4' and second, it has failed to stimulate ex-
pansion of export activities because it does not provide sufficient cer-
tainty.1 4
2
The Webb-Pomerene Act grew from a need to allow U.S. pro-
ducers to compete overseas with powerful foreign cartels. 143 In 1916
the Federal Trade Commission published a study that noted the im-
portance of export trade to the U.S. economy and the disadvantages
suffered by domestic producers due to the concerted activities of
foreign competitors and purchasers. 44 As a result Congress enacted
the Webb-Pomerene Act two years later authorizing exporters to
combine in order to share the costs and risks of exporting without
antitrust liability.
145
139. 15 U.S.C. SS 61-66 (1976).
140. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXPORT TRADING COM-
PANIES, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND TRADE SERVICES, S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1981) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
141. Id. at 19.
142. Id. at 18. See also S. 144 Hearings, supra note 89, at 18-20 (statement of Sen. Steven-
son) and 33-34 (statement of Sen. Danforth).
143. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 295.
144. U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT
TRADE (1916).
145. Pub. L. No. 65-126, S 50, 40 Stat. 516 (1918). The FTC Report noted that con-
siderable doubt existed both within the business and legal communities as to the application
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The Webb-Pomerene Act has not lived up to congressional ex-
pectations and very few exporters have chosen to operate under the
Webb exemption. In 1976, for example, the Webb associations ac-
counted for only 1.5 percent of U.S. exports.1 46 The law has
generally been used not by small firms to gain efficiencies, but rather
by large firms to set prices and terms of sale for foreign markets:
"[T]he common feature of Webb export associations today is not
their performance or efficiency or cost-reducing function, but rather
the pursuit of traditional cartel-related activities.
"147
Implicit in the Trade Association Act is the suggestion that the
nature and scope of the Webb-Pomerene exemption is not suffi-
ciently clear to attract small exporters. 148 There is, however, little
factual support for this conclusion. As a practical matter, it is in-
conceivable that an efficiency-promoting association of small firms
would fall outside of the antitrust exemption currently enjoyed by
combinations of large firms in concentrated industries that are
engaged in classic cartel practices.
The Federal Trade Commission has conducted several reviews of
Webb associations since the passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act. In
of the antitrust laws to export trade. "This uncertainty, with the attendant possibility of pro-
secution, prevented American companies from cooperating in export activities and
hindered a needed expansion of U.S. exports. In order to clarify this situation, the Commis-
sion recommended that legislation be enacted to remove this doubt." NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION, supra note 89, at 296.
146. AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, supra note 33, at 312 n. 141.
147. See U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE
ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW 29, 34 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FTC WEBB-
POMERENE 50-YEAR REVIEW].
148. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 297.
I was advised that we could not look to other firms in our industry for a partner-
ship in providing such a full range of products in these possible transactions
because joint discussions or ajoint venture setting mutually agreed prices between
us and our U.S. competitors as to foreign customers was thought to risk a viola-
tion of the U.S. antitrust laws. More recently, I have talked to antitrust lawyers
who are experienced in international trade. They tell me there is very little risk of
antitrust prosecution for a small firm in my industry, which is very competitive
and nonconcentrated, ii forming a joint venture for exports. This may be true.
But you must understand the extent to which a small businessman, who cannot af-
ford to retain and seek constant high-priced antitrust counsel, fears the antitrust
law and is inclined to stay as far away from possible exposure as he can, even if it
means giving up business opportunities.
S. 144 Hearings, supra note 89, at 285-86 (testimony of Milton Schulman).
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a 1955 study of Webb associations that had disbanded or were inac-
tive, the FTC attempted to determine why they chose not to utilize
the exemption. 149 There was no evidence that uncertainty caused
the attrition. The major reason identified for dissolution of an
association was foreign price competition.1 50 Other significant
reasons included the existence of foreign trade barriers, a desire to
restructure the association, and a failure to continue conforming to
the requirements. of the law. Only one association blamed the ac-
tions of a foreign agency or cartel for its dissolution. 151
The Webb-Pomerene Act is ineffective not because its applica-
tion is uncertain, but because it is premised on erroneous economic
concepts. Cartels seldom produce efficiencies; they are difficult to
maintain and discipline, and cannot survive competition. 52 The
most successful Webb associations are made up of major firms pro-
ducing standardized raw materials in concentrated U.S. industries
that could export individually and still realize economies of scale.
153
Where competition did not exist, such as in the markets dominated
by the cartels of pre-World War II Europe, the exempt Webb
associations did not break the cartels by creating competition;
rather, the stringent application of U.S. antitrust laws ended the
European cartels.154
All told, the Webb-Pomerene Act is not a sound vehicle for a
meaningful clarification of the antitrust laws. Its application to
export-promoting associations of small- or medium-sized firms is
reasonably clear, but in the past they have chosen not to use it. Sure-
ly adding a substantial regulatory bureaucracy and complex pro-
cedure will not stimulate greater use.'
55
Negative Implications of the Trade Association Act
The obvious implication of a statute establishing immunity from
the antitrust laws is that the immunity is needed; i.e., that the im-
149. FTC WEBB-POMERENE 50-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 147, at 26-27.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
153. See FTC WEBB-POMERENE 50-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 147, at 64-66.
154. See Rahl, International Cartels and Their Regulation in COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: LAW AND POLICY OF RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES 240 (Schacter & Hellawell, eds.
1981).
155. See supra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
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munized activity would violate the law but for the exemption. A
close look at the Trade Association Act, however, shows that when
its standards are met the certified activities would not violate the an-
titrust laws. 156 Immunity under the Trade Association Act could be
withheld even when there is no cognizable domestic effect sug-
gesting violation of the antitrust laws. For example, certification
must be denied if the applicant does not show that its activities serve
a "specified need" in promoting export trade, though the activities
may not have any significant impact on U.S. markets, consumers,
or competitors. 157 The logical implication of the bill is that the an-
titrust laws are fully applicable to concerted export activities
regardless of their effect on the U.S. marketplace. Immunity may be
given or withheld at the discretion of a federal bureaucracy for
reasons that are wholly unrelated to the competitive impact of the
export activity.
The Webb-Pomerene Act itself has been criticized for harboring
a negative implication, or "negative pregnant," regarding the inter-
national reach of the antitrust laws.1 58 The Supreme Court read
such an implication into the Act in Pfizer v. India where the Court
held that foreign plaintiffs injured by an antitrust violation have
standing to sue in U.S. courts under section 4 of the Clayton Act on
the same basis as domestic corporations or individuals. 159 The
Court based its decision in part on the view that transactions in U.S.
exports are covered by the Sherman Act unless the Webb pro-
156. Ky P. Ewing, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division,
Department ofJustice, testified at a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee that an
antitrust exemption for trading companies was not necessary because appropriate joint ex-
port activities were not currently illegal under the U.S. antitrust laws. 1979 Senate Hearings,
supra note 89, at 137-52. Mr. Ewing testified to the same effect ajain in 1981. S. 144 Hear-
ings, supra note 89, at 341-44. He noted that the certification procedures that would allow a
trading company to qualify for an exemption to the antitrust laws would be extremely com-
plex, creating a bureaucratic nightmare. Id. at 341. In addition, he underscored the Justice
Department's traditional view that U.S. businesses do not require antitrust exemption or
clearance to engage in joint exporting activity, the sole purpose of which is to sell goods or
services for consumption abroad. Id. at 342.
157. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 206(a)(6), 127CoNC. REc. S3667, S3670-71 (dai-
ly ed. Apr. 8, 1981) (proposed amendment to Webb-Pomerene Act S 4(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. S
64 (1976).
158.J. ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 33, at 351-52. See also Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 19, at 12 (statement ofJames R. Atwood).
159. 434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978).
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cedures are utilized. 160 Atwood and Brewster argue that the
Webb-Pomerene Act should be repealed rather than amended
because exporters acting outside the provision of the amended Act,
98 percent of U.S. export trade, would "be even further intimidated
by the negative pregnant that is inherent in the Webb Act's narrow
grant of immunity."
161
The Trade Association Act's implication that the antitrust laws
apply to all non-immunized joint export activities, coupled with the
complex immunizing mechanism, will affect small- and medium-
sized firms. If these companies believe that they must act at their
peril under the antitrust laws, or subject themselves to pervasive
review and regulation by several federal agencies, they are likely to
avoid the export market altogether.162 The very fact that this legisla-
tion is being considered may already be chilling U.S. export ac-
tivities.
A primary goal of the Trade Association Act is to foster the crea-
tion of trading companies. This goal is based in large part on the
phenomenal success of Japanese export trading companies, the Sogo
Shosa, 163 highly integrated firms engaged in aggressive international
trade that are generally able to provide a "full line" of export services,
including financing, insurance, and transportation. 64  These
trading companies, however, are not simply service organizations,
but rather transnational corporate giants that dominate much of the
Japanese economy.
165
The Trade Association Act suggests that companies modeled on
the Japanese firms, or approaching that model, risk violating the an-
160. The Supreme Court suggested that Congress, which had provided a "narrow and
carefully limited exception for export activity that would otherwise violate the antitrust
laws," would not have done so if it intended to make the treble damage remedy available on-
ly to consumers in the United States. For this reason, the Court concluded that a civil cause
of action for antitrust violations was also available to foreign sovereigns. See id. at 314 n. 12.
161.J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, at 352.
162. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
163. 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 28-29 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assis-
tant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs) and 104-107 (statement of the National
Association of Manufacturers).
164. Id. at 58-59 (statement of Frederick W. Huszagh, Executive Director, Dean Rusk
Center).
165. Id. at 29. C. Fred Bergsten testified that the top nine Japanese trading companies
wield staggering market power. In 1975, they controlled 56.4 percent of all Japanese ex-
ports, 55.6 percent of total imports and their total sales represented 31 percent ofJapan's
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titrust laws. Yet, while U.S. firms await passage of this legislation,
Japanese trading companies that are subject to U.S. antitrust laws
are expanding their U.S. operations, 66 thus indicating that these
laws do not deter export trading company activities. In addition, at
least three U.S. trading giants that rival the Japanese companies in
size and business volume have operated for many years: Cargill,
Inc., which is reputed to be the world's largest grain-trading com-pany, 16 7 Continental Grain Company, 168 and Philipp Brothers. 169
Presumably, the Japanese firms and giant U.S. grain and oil
traders, together with the great majority of U.S. exporters that have
chosen to operate outside of the Webb-Pomerene Act, are well
counseled and do not believe that their activities violate the antitrust
laws. Establishing an elaborate mechanism for them to obtain an-
titrust immunity may compel an interpretation of the antitrust laws
that requires them to do so. The result could be extremely serious:
existing exporters may be found liable in treble damages for past ac-
tivities, and all existing and potential exporters, large and small,
would have to decide if the rewards of the export market are worth
the price of pervasive federal regulation.
Degree of Certainty
To be effective, the Trade Association Act should satisfy three
criteria: its standards must be clear, its procedures swift and un-
burdensome, and its benefits certain. 170 The Act fails on all three
counts. Not only are the legislation's standards nebulous and its
nominal gross national product. Id.
166. Large Japanese trading companies, particularly the Mitsubishi group, have ex-
panded their operations in the U.S. market which they consider attractive because of its
stability. In turn, the Japanese companies increasingly are being sought as partners by ma-
jor American corporations because of"their expertise, their globe-girdling marketing prow-
ess and the low-cost financing they can provide." U.S. Ties GrowingforJapan's Traders, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 10, 1980, D1, col. 1.
167.D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN, 168-69 (1979).
168. Morgan indicates that on average, Cargill, Inc. and Continental Grain Company
each handle about a quarter of total U.S. grain exports. Id. at 234.
169. Philipp Brothers, a division of Engelhard Minerals & Chemicals Corp., is reputed to
be one of the world's largest and most diversified marketers of raw materials. See Inside
Philipp Bros., supra note 124, at 108.
170. 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 335 (statement of A. Paul Victor, Partner,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York).
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procedures complex,1 7 1 but the promised certainty is illusory.
172
Certification would not immunize an association from suit. The
proposed statute would protect associations only for those trade ac-
tivities and methods of operation that are certified and conducted
within the terms and conditions stated in the certificate. 173 An
association or trading company that is sued must expect to shoulder
the burden of proving that the Commerce Department, in consulta-
tion with the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission,
authorized its activities. The nature of the certification process, and
the standards for certification, will render such a defense extremely
difficult when serious anticompetitive injury has been experienced
in the domestic market or by a domestic competitor in foreign com-
merce.
Certification may not be granted under the Trade Association Act
for activities that substantially restrain trade in the United States or
with a domestic competitor,' 7 4 or that will unreasonably affect prices
in the United States.1 7 5 It will not take a very ingenious lawyer to
understand that a complaint must only allege conduct outside the
scope of the certificate. Such an allegation will not be difficult to
make. Suppose, for example, that an association has been certified
to establish prices and allocate territories among its members and
that its pricing and territorial policies seriously injure a U.S. com-
petitor or consumer. The injured party may allege that the associa-
tion members have combined or conspired to destroy it, an act which
itself violates antitrust law176 without regard to the legality of the
means employed to accomplish the act. 177 An allegation of injurious
171. See supra notes 94-138 and accompanying text.
172. See Murphy, supra note 101, at 409.
173. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 204, 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3669-70 (propos-
ing new section 2(b) to Webb-Pomerene Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. S 62 (1976)).
174. Id. (proposing new section 2(a)(2)).
175. Id. (proposing new section 2(a)(3)).
176. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (concerted refusal
to deal illegalperse); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ("it is
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market"); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (fixing floor price illegal per se).
177. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(refusal to provide gas for use in plaintiffs burners because burners did not have "seal of ap-
proval" illegal in the absence of objective standards for obtaining seal); Sugar Institute, Inc.
v. United States, 296 U.S. 553 (1936) (Institute's requirement that all members adhere to
publicly announced prices and terms illegal, although announcement of prices and terms
not illegal).
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conduct not specifically identified in a certificate would similarly
threaten to deny the defendant's activities the protection of the
Trade Association Act.
For several reasons courts will be likely to find liability whenever a
significant U.S. injury has occurred. First, there will be a natural
disinclination to leave without relief a domestic party who has suf-
fered a serious antitrust injury. Second, the Secretary of Commerce
has no authority to certify conduct having a substantial an-
ticompetitive effect on U.S. persons or commerce, 7 8 and the courts
are not likely to find that a certificate was intended to provide pro-
tection when those effects have been experienced. Finally, antitrust
exemptions are narrowly construed. 7 9
The Trade Association Act also requires certified associations to
report any "material changes" in their membership or operations
and allows amendment of the certificate. 80 The House counterpart
to the Trade Association Act, H.R. 1648, states that an amendment
noting a material change must be filed within thirty days to avoid an
"interruption in the period for which the certificate is in effect." 181
The legislation's lack of certainty is exacerbated by the danger of los-
ing a certificate's protection if the challenged conduct proves to be a
material change in the association's activities, or if the association is
held to have failed to report in timely fashion some other material
change. The concept of "materiality" itself has spawned complex,
fact-specific litigation in other legal contexts.
182
178. S. 734, 97th Cong., lst Sess., sec. 204, 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3669-70 (propos-
ing new section 2(a)(2) to Webb-Pomerene Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976)).
179. Ottertail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (industry regulated by
Federal Power Act not exempt from Sherman Act); Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244-46 & n.4 (1968) ("public interest
subsumes antitrust laws which cannot be ignored without statutory direction"); Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (New York Stock Exchange not exempt
from Sherman Act in the absence of an express repealer in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934). See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 717-51 (1977).
180. S. 734, 97th Cong., lst Sess. sec. 206(a), 127 CONG. REC. S3669, S3671 (proposing
new section 4(c)-(d) to Webb-Pomerene Act §S 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 64, 65 (1976)).
181. H.R. 1648, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 206(a) (proposing new section 4(c) to
Webb-Pomerene Act §§ 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. 64, 65 (1976)).
182. Litigation under the securities laws provides a prime example of the complexities of
litigating under a "materiality" standard. See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952).
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The protective benefits of the proposed legislation are also jeopar-
dized by the several avenues open for amendment or decertification.
If the Department of Justice or FTC disagrees with a Commerce
Department certification, either agency would have the option of su-
ing the newly certified association before its certificate becomes ef-
fective. 183 At any time the Secretary of Commerce would be permit-
ted to begin a proceeding to revoke or modify a certificate' 8 4 or the
two antitrust enforcement agencies could file suit to have the
association decertified. 8 5 Any decision to seek certification would
take into account this " 'sword of Damacles' of unclear government
regulation."186
At times the failure of the Department of Justice or the FTC to
seek injunctive relief immediately in the event either agency notified
the Department of Commerce of their disapproval would be more
chilling than the action itself. The potential benefits to be derived
from the certification would have to be great to persuade an associa-
tion to go ahead with a substantial commitment to export trade,
knowing that the Department of Justice believes its certificate to be
improvidently granted. Similarly, the fact of decertification may
needlessly deter permissible trade activity. For example, an associa-
tion may lose its certification if it sells goods that are later sold back
into the United States187 or if it transfers technology not incidental to
the sale of goods. 88 The risk of antitrust liability upon the loss of a
certificate would be extraordinary, even if the association had never
engaged in questionable activities. Prudence may require an
association to terminate all trade activities until the certificate can be
reinstated.
The Chilling Effect on Export Trade
On both practical and philosophical levels the Antitrust Im-
provements Act is fundamentally different from the Trade Associa-
f
183. S.734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 206(a), 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3671 (proposing
new section 4(e) to Webb-Pomerene Act SS 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. 64, 65 (1976)).
184. Id. sec. 206(a) (proposing new section 4(d)).
185. Id. sec. 206(a) (proposing new section 4(e)).
186. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of Thomas Rees, attorney and part-
ner in export trading company).
187. S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 204, 127 CONG. REC. S3667, S3670 (proposing
new section 2(a)(5) to Webb-Pomerene Act S 2, 15 U.S.C. S 62 (1976)).
188. Id. sec. 204 (proposing new section 2(a)(6)).
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tion Act in its implicit statements of the appropriate scope of the an-
titrust laws. Although both bills attempt to render less uncertain the
reach of the antitrust laws to international transactions, the bills
select different means to reach that end. The Antitrust Im-
provements Act states that antitrust laws do not apply to activities
that do not directly, substantially, and forseeably affect the U.S.
marketplace or U.S. competitors. 189 In contrast, the Trade Associa-
tion Act states implicitly that the antitrust laws apply fully to foreign
trade, but if certain procedures are followed and standards met, an
association may be granted limited immunity from the laws.
There are many reasons why U.S. businesses avoid the export
market: language barriers, the application of alien laws, fluctuations
in exchange rates, various domestic legal restrictions and controls,
and a generally adequate home market. 190 The concern over an-
titrust enforcement has been for the most part a nagging fear
without demonstrable substance. 191 The Trade Association Act
would give substance to that concern by offering the traditional
remedy for an industry that cannot or should not operate under the
constraints of the competitive marketplace: regulation.
Without providing absolute immunity from suit, or certain
dismissal at the pleadings stage of litigation, the Trade Association
Act gives business less than the Antitrust Improvements Act at a
much higher cost. Once traders observe that the Justice Department
or Federal Trade Commission obstructs certification, or that suits
alleging activity beyond the scope of the certificates result in
lengthy, complex litigation, few traders will choose to seek cer-
tificates. If in addition courts read a negative pregnant into the bill,
requiring certification, the Trade Association Act would become yet
another dramatic disincentive to desirable trade.
THE FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1981
The Antitrust Improvements Act,1 92 if enacted, would basically
codify existing enforcement policy 93 and the dominant judicial view
189. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of James R. Atwood).
190. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
192. H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For the history of H.R. 5235 see supra note
193. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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of the appropriate Sherman Act jurisdictional standard.' 94 As
originally introduced, the bill established the effects standard and
exempted joint export ventures from section 7 of the Clayton Act.1
95
In its present version, the Act would apply the effects standard only
to export trade, exempt joint export ventures from the scope of the
Clayton Act, and clarify section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act by similarly limiting its application to export trade where the re-
quisite effects may be found. 96
Applicable Standards
Adoption by Congress of an appropriate jurisdictional standard
for antitrust law would be a significant response to the uncertainty
about and perceived threat of antitrust enforcement. The adoption
of the standard embodied in the Antitrust Improvements
Act-"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect"-would clearly be appropriate because it already has found
support in prior judicial decisions and enforcement policy. 197 It
would provide certainty both by fixing the appropriate effects stan-
dard and by eliminating the risk that liability may be based on ex-
traterritorial activities having no appreciable domestic conse-
quences.198
At congressional hearings on H.R. 2326, the predecessor to the
current version of the bill, H.R. 5235,199 several witnesses testified
that the jurisdictional standard should require that the proscribed
conduct have a "foreseeable," as well as a "direct and substantial," ef-
fect requirement.200 Chairman Rodino accepted the suggestion:
H.R. 5235 predicates jurisdiction on a "direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce or domestic
persons. 201 The inclusion of a "foreseeability" test is consistent with
Judge Hand's intent requirement as courts have viewed it since
194. ABA Report, supra note 49, at 14-21.
195,. H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
196. See supra note 192.
197. See supra notes 34-60 and accompanying text.
198. The ABA Report states that the House bill would afford American businesses in-
creased assurance that joint and unilateral export activities would be protected as long as
they do not affect United States domestic or export commerce. ABA Report, supra note 49,
at 30.
199. See supra note 1.
200. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
201. See supra note 192.
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Alcoa,20 2 and is not particularly onerous for potential plaintiffs. A
"reasonably foreseeable" test is an objective standard that will not re-
quire proof of an actor's state of mind. Rather, it will require proof
that the facts were such as to put a reasonable person on notice of the
prohibited domestic effects.
The Antitrust Improvements Act would prevent the
Timberlane/Mannington Mills comity formulation 20 3 from expanding
jurisdiction to activities lacking any significant effect on the U.S.
market. It would not, however, prevent the federal courts from con-
sidering issues of comity, but would set a jurisdictional threshold
that must be crossed before comity considerations would be ap-
propriate or necessary. That is, jurisdiction would not lie solely
because its assertion would be inoffensive to the principles of comity
among nations; there also would have to be a sufficient domestic ef-
fect.
Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act
Amendments
The amendments to the Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act are necessary to effectuate the salutary amendment of the
Sherman Act. Through the Antitrust Improvements Act the spon-
sors are announcing to the exporting community and the courts that
U.S. exporters should be free to compete aggressively in foreign
markets under the rules that prevail in those markets. 20 4 Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, however, reaches potentially anticompetitive joint
ventures in their incipiency and could proscribe joint export ac-
tivities having minimal or merely potential domestic effects. 20 5 The
Antitrust Improvements Act, therefore, would exempt all joint ven-
tures limited to export commerce with foreign nations, leaving such
joint ventures subject to the amended Sherman Act and the Federal
202. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
204. See Rodino Remarks, supra note 85, at 3.
205. U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966) ("Congress sought to preserve
competition among many small businesses by arresting a trend toward concentration in its
incipiency. . . ."); U.S. v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964) ("[the pur-
pose of the] original Act was to arrest incipient threats to competition which the Sherman
Act did not ordinarily reach"); Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) ("[A]
keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw as the rising tide of economic con-
centration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a
lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.").
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Trade Commission Act. 20 6
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has not been a
serious threat to Americans engaged in international trade.20 7 The
potential sweep of the statute, however, particularly the fact that it
reaches activities that tend toward a violation of the Sherman Act,
20 8
renders it a threat to the Antitrust Improvements Act's goal of
removing a needless disincentive to export trade, i.e., uncertainty
about the applicability of the antitrust laws to extraterritorial con-
duct. 20 9 This aim would be seriously jeopardized if one antitrusten-
forcement agency retained the authority to apply a different, less
stringent standard and prohibit activities that the amended Sher-
man Act and Clayton Act would permit. Accordingly, H.R. 5235
would make an appropriate amendment to the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act as well as to the Sherman Act.
210
Imports
Some witnesses expressed concern in congressional hearings that
the Antitrust Improvements Act would extend to import, as well as
export, activities: 211 "it is important that there be no misunderstand-
ing that import restraints, which can be damaging to American
206. See supra note 192.
207. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of David N. Goldsweig).
208. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948) ("all con-
duct violative of the Sherman Act may likewise come within the unfair trade practice pro-
hibitions of the Trade Commission Act").
209. See, e.g., Remarks of the Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr.:
My own involvement with legislative efforts to increase exports has been focus-
ed on the antitrust laws. Many businessmen say that our antitrust laws have
prevented participation by American producers in the export market because they
are uncertain about how the laws apply to joint export transactions. While proper
antitrust counseling could eliminate most ot these problems, the mere perception
of an antitrust barrier may deter some small and medium-sized firms from enter-
ing the export market.
Together with Mr. McClory, the ranking minority member of the Judiciary
Committee, I have introduced legislation to clarify the international reach of the
antitrust laws with respect to export activities. H.R. 2326, the Foreign Trade An-
titrust Improvements Act, will eliminate application of the antitrust laws to export
transactions that have no direct and substantial impact on our domestic
marketplace.
Rodino Remarks, supra note 85, at 4.
210. See supra note 192.
211. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of James R. Atwood).
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consumers, remain covered by the law."212 H.R. 5235 addresses this
issue by limiting the statute's reach to "conduct involving export
trade or export commerce." 213 It is doubtful that H.R. 2326 would
have had adverse effects on import trade. The Wilson Tariff Act
214
remains a specific barrier to restraints on imports, and any mean-
ingful restriction on imports would satisfy a "direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect" standard.
Limiting the bill to export trade leaves the Sherman Act's ap-
plicability to import restraints clearly unaltered. It does, however,
create a problem. Cases like Pacific Seafarers, Inc. extend the scope of
the Sherman Act to conduct that involves neither the import nor ex-
port trade of the United States. 215 As introduced, the Antitrust Im-
provements Act applied to conduct such as that found in Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. as well as to export trade; the new form of the legisla-
tion leaves the issue to the courts.
216
U. S. Resolve and International Cartels
Dean Rahl voiced the most serious objection to the Antitrust Im-
provements Act when he noted that it might generate new or rein-
vigorate existing international cartels. Having documented the role
of U.S. antitrust enforcement in the demise of many major interna-
tional cartels operating after World War 11,217 Rahl fears that any
retreat from an aggressive antitrust policy may encourage their
rebirth.218 The concern is justified. The unique role of the United
States as an advocate of a competitive international market21 9 adds
significance to any hint that its commitment to this goal is waning. If
212. Id. (statement of James R. Atwood).
213. See supra note 192.
214. 15 U:S.C. SS 8-11 (1976) (prohibiting trusts intended to operate in restraint of im-
port trade).
215. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
216. Compare H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 2 (1981) (proposing new S 7 to the Sher-
man Act, at 15 U.S.C. SS 1-7 (1976)) ("SEc. 7.'This Act shall not apply to conduct involv-
ing trade or commerce with any foreign nation....") with H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
S 1 (1981) (proposing new § 7 to the Sherman Act, at 15 U.S.C. S§ 1-7 (1976)) ("'SEc. 7.'
This Act shall apply to conduct involving export trade or export commerce, with foreign na-
tions, only if . ... ).
217. Rahl, supra note 154.
218. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement ofJames A. Rahl, Professor of Law).
219. Rahl, supra note 154.
[Vol. 14:1
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
foreign and domestic businessmen are led to believe that "no holds
are barred" in the international market it could have unfortunate
consequences. The re-establishment of international cartels is
undesirable, of course, because cartels produce fewer goods for
higher prices and allocate resources inefficiently.
22 0
A perception that the United States is no longer committed to the
goal of international competition would also diminish, if not
destroy, the credibility of the United States as the major advocate of
free markets. The United States has, through persuasion, example,
and the application of its own antitrust laws, been largely responsi-
ble for a major shift in the free world's attitude towards private
monopoly.221 The German and Japanese antitrust laws, for exam-
ple, are largely patterned on U.S. laws, 222 and the United States has
been a principal advocate of the free market by promoting the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations
Conference on Restrictive Business Practices.2 23 Those govern-
ments that are not historically committed to a competitive
marketplace may more vigorously resist any future changes toward
open international markets if the United States lessens its commit-
ment to free trade.
A more concrete and serious potential consequence of a relaxation
of antitrust laws would be the growth of protectionist legislation. If it
appears that one of the most powerful economies in the world is
turning the protection of its antitrust laws inward -freeing its in-
dustries to engage in monopolistic practices beyond its
shores -other nations may establish protectionist barriers against
U.S. firms. 22 4 Several foreign nations are already angered by the en-
forcement of U.S. antitrust laws against their business firms.
2 25 If
220. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 154, chs. 9, 10.
221. See Rahl, supra note 154.
222. See International Aspects of Antitrust Laws: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Present State, Current Theory and Trends of Inter-
national Antitrust Laws, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 25, 53 (1974) (testimony of E. Ernest
Goldstein, Partner, Coudert Bros., Paris, France and Dr. Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker,
Professor, University of Bielefeld, School of Law, Bielefeld, West Germany).
223. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
396-99 (1977).
224. Ongman, supra note 24, at 186-87.
225. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, at § 4.09; Pettit & Styles, The Interna-
tional Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697
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the United States appears to lessen the protection afforded those
firms under the antitrust laws while still subjecting them to civil and
criminal prosecution, foreign anger could quickly turn to outrage.
The existing "blocking'22 6 and "clawback ' 227 statutes could be
followed by outright discriminatory protectionist legislation.
Although Dean Rahl's fear is well-founded and serious, several
factors minimize the risk of regeneration of cartels. Most obvious is
the existence of significant foreign antitrust statutes. 228 Any U.S.
firm believing that the Antitrust Improvements Act, or any other
statute, can eliminate all restraints on international anticompetitive
activities is mistaken. In the first place, it is likely that a major inter-
national cartel would have adverse effects on U.S. commerce and
thus come within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In addition, more
significant anticompetitive practices would violate the laws of our
largest trading partners, the European Community 229 and Ja-
pan .230
The legislative history that Congress would compile in any
amendment of antitrust law can demonstrate to foreign nations the
continuing commitment of the United States to free trade. Congress
could emphasize that the Antitrust Improvements Act is based, at
least in part, on a recognition that many foreign governments have
adopted their own rules embodying the principles of U.S. antitrust
laws and policy and that the United States should renew its resolve
to foster mutual cooperation in the establishment and enforcment of
these policies. James Atwood testified that:
H.R. 2326 would make clear to foreign governments that the
protection of competition within their home markets is their
responsibility, not the responsibility of the United States.
The United States should stand ready to provide reasonable
enforcement assistance to foreign antitrust authorities in-
vestigating the conduct of American firms, and H.R. 2326
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Pettit & Styles].
226. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, § 4.17; Pettit & Styles, supra note 225, at
699-714.
227. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 33, § 4.18.
228. Davidow, International Antitrust Codes: the Post Acceptance Phase, 26 ANTITRUST BULL.
567, 568 (1981).
229. See generally B. HAWK, supra note 33; COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST,
supra note 33.
230. See Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, 11 LAW IN JAPAN 57 (1978).
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should therefore not be viewed as a "hunting license" for
American firms to exploit foreign consumers or to cartelize
foreign markets. Rather, it is an invitation to our trading
partners to strengthen and develop their own antitrust pro-
grams, and where appropriate to scrutinize suspected con-
duct by American firms.
Thus I am convinced that legislation such as H.R. 2326,
when properly understood and explained, will not be regard-
ed as a retreat from America's devotion to a free and com-
petitive system of world trade.
231
CONCLUSION
The Antitrust Improvements Act is a reasoned response to the
widely held perception that the antitrust laws are a barrier to
desirable international trade. It carefully signals to the international
and domestic trade community that extraterritorial activities are
primarily the concern of those nations affected by the conduct. At
the same time, however, it reasserts a national commitment to pro-
tect U.S. consumers and competitors from substantial injury caused
by anticompetitive acts.
Many antitrust experts who have examined the proposed legisla-
tion have noted their preference for the creation of a study commis-
sion prior to the adoption of any substantive change to the Sherman
Act. 232 Although there is merit to the suggestion and a commission is
warranted, it is appropriate for Congress to adopt legislation now.
The political momentum for a response to the "antitrust problem" is
so great that the passage of some legislation is extremely likely. That
legislation may either reject the principles of competition in the in-
ternational market and establish a regulatory exemption, or it may
fine-tune the antitrust laws to account for the unique characteristics
of foreign trade. The Antitrust Improvements Act adopts the latter
approach and is manifestly preferable to other, more, radical ap-
proaches.
Finally, whatever risk there might be that the Antitrust Im-
provements Act could be interpreted to signal a loss of commitment
to a competitive, free enterprise system could be minimized by
231. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of James R. Atwood) (emphasis in
original).
232. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 19 (statement of James A. Rahl).
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careful construction of the legislative history. It can and should be
made clear that the United States will not tolerate international ac-
tivities, by its own or other nationals, that substantially interfere
with the operation of free market forces in the United States.
Likewise, the United States should continue to foster free interna-
tional trade through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and
agreement. If appropriately drafted, the primary import of the
legislation will be to recognize that the regulation of foreign market
activities is primarily the concern of those nations most directly af-
fected by the conduct. U.S. antitrust laws may then continue to pro-
tect U.S. commerce and consumers.
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